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Scaling property and opinion model for interevent time of terrorism attack
Jun-Fang Zhu,∗ Xiao-Pu Han,† and Bing-Hong Wang‡
Department of Modern Physics, University of the Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
The interevent time of terrorism attack events is investigated by empirical data and model analysis. Empirical
evidence shows it follows a scale-free property. In order to understand the dynamic mechanism of such statistic
feature, an opinion dynamic model with memory effect is proposed on a two-dimension lattice network. The
model mainly highlights the role of individual social conformity and self-affirmation psychology. An attack
event occurs when the order parameter of the system reaches a critical value. Ultimately, the model reproduces
the same statistical property as the empirical data and gives a good understanding of terrorism attack.
PACS: 89.75.Da, 89.65.Ef, 89.75,-k.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, terrorism attack events have occurred frequently. It has attracted interests of many scientists such as historians,
politicians, physicists and so on. Many people might think terrorism attack is random and unpredictable. But, indeed there are
some general, common statistic property, just like the result from other fields where the non-poison distribution is captured for
the interevent time of the e-mail [1], surface mail[2], short message lending [3], web browsing [4,5], and rating of movies [6]
etc.
As early as 1948, Richardson found the number of casualty follows a power-law distribution in interstate wars [7]. Recently the
same statistic property is revealed for the casualty numbers in the global terrorism events [8]. Actually the terrorism events can be
thought as wars in war. However, so far, the fundamental reason of terrorism events still remain unclear in view of its complexity
and diversity. At present, there are mainly three kinds of viewpoints to explain the burst of terrorism events. The first kind is the
self-organized critical notion. At first, Cederman [9] gave a possible interpretation for the finding of Richardson[7] by an agent-
based model. After 9/11 event, The analysis for Iraq, Colombia, Afghanistan[10-12] displays the power law distribution with a
scaling exponent α = 2.5 which conforms with the non-G7 countries, the ones except the major industrialized nation: Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, in old war [8]. Meanwhile the author proposed the
self-organized critical model of interaction among terrorist groups who make decision of coalescence or fragmentation randomly
or with some one probability. This model produces the results coinciding with the statistic data and give insight in term of the
conception of complex system. Further, it is generalized and perfected by Clauset[13], and the solution of the steady-state
behavior is obtained analytically under the conditions of constant number of terrorism-inclined individuals and the proportional
relation between the severity and the size of the attacking cell. The second one proposed by Galam[14-17] is the terrorism model
of percolation theory based on individual passive supporters. In this model one territory is under the terrorist threat if the density
of the passive supporters exceeds percolation threshold in this territory. Further one clue is given to curb terrorism threat without
harming the passive supporters. The specific scheme is increasing the value of terrorism percolation threshold by decreasing the
space dimension but not the number of nearest neighbors. This interesting model describes the state of terrorism and gives an
orient to fight against terrorism. The third one is the competition, selection viewpoint. Clauset et al. [18] found the scale-free
property of frequency-severity ditribution has evident robustness on burst means and stability over time since 1968. they have
developed a toy model to explain this kind of behavior by the mechanism of competition between states and the non-state actors
successfully. In another reference [19], from the strategic selection, they illuminate the substitution and the competition in the
Israel-Palestine conflict is the reason whether an organization resort to terrorism where the public standing is first thought a
origin of attack occurrence.
From the aspect of fighting against terrorism, besides the model of percolation theory, the conditions of promoting a vio-
lence[20] are also referetial. Lim et al.[20] think that a violence arises at boundaries between groups with culture diffentiation
when the group size achieves a critical scale and point out the violence might be prevented or minimized if appropriate bound-
aries is created for current geocultural regions. However that is not indisputable[27]. Recently, the variation of the interevent
time over time have been concerned, and the research of Clauset et al.[21] shows the organizational growth leads to the decrease
of the interevent time.
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FIG. 1: The succession of terrorism events in Iraq (upper panel) and Afghanistan (lower panel). Each vertical line represents a single event.
In this paper we focus on the interevent time of terrorism events in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003 to 2007. It is found to
obey Zipf’s law corresponding with the power-law distribution with scaling exponents α = 2.43 and α = 2.35 for Iraq and
Afghanistan respectively. Considering the importance of memory[22-24], we propose an opinion dynamic model with memory
effect to understand such a statistic property. Due to individual social conformity and self-affirmation psychology, the public
opinion is formed and varies with time under the coaction of influence between individuals [25] and individual history memory
[26]. Ultimately, under some certain social circumstance, an attack event occurs when the public consensus reaches some degree.
We have found that this model can reproduce the same intervent time distribution of terrorism events.
II. THE EMPIRICAL DATA
Our data can be available from the database of MIPT (http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/incidentcalendar.asp), which records
the detailed information of terrorism attack events and includes the domestic event after 1998. Since there are huge differences
of terrorism events for different countries, our statistics are distinguished as different countries.
As well known, terrorism attack events frequently occur in Iraq and Afghanistan due to the deep ethnic contradiction, intense
religious struggle and increasing anti-Western emotion. The patterns of terrorism events occurrence in Iraq and Afghanistan are
shown in Fig. 1. Apparently the succession of events takes on a pattern with long time inactivity. Then what statistic character
does this kind of activity pattern has? In order to make it clear, we study the interevent time distribution of terrorism attack
events in these two countries from 2003 to 2007.
The interevent time obtained from everyday event number. It is assumed that the events occur homogeneously and the
interevent time is the reciprocal of event number in this day if the event number is more than one in a day. Otherwise the
interevent time corresponds the number of days between two consecutive events. Because the diversity of interevent time is not
enough, we draw the rank plots in Fig. 2. Obviously there exist Zipf’s laws. It suggests that the time between two consecutive
attack events is usually very short, and the long interevent time is also can’t be ignored. Indeed, a Zipf’s law can be consider as
a cumulative distribution with a power-law form. If the probability ditribution of interevent time follows p(τ) = τ−α, the Zipf’s
exponent α′ should satisfy the relation [28,29]
R−1/α
′
=
∫ ∞
R
p(τ)dτ ∝ R−(α−1). (1)
Here R represents the rank. We find the Zipf’s exponent α′ = 0.70 for Iraq and α′ = 0.73 for Afghanistan. In term of the
above relation, we have α = 1 + 1/α′. So the interevent time distribution has power exponent α = 2.43 and α = 2.35 for Iraq
and Afghanistan respectively. For Afghanistan, the smaller exponent means the interevent time is more heterogenous than Iraq,
namely, the occurrence of terrorism events in Afghanistan shows more burstiness property.
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FIG. 2: The interevent time distribution of terrorism attack events in Zipf’s plot for Iraq (a) and Afghanistan (b) from 2003 to 2007. The circles
represent the empirical data, and the solid line is the linear fitting.
III. THE MODEL
To understand the underlying mechanism of the scaling property in terrorism events, we introduce an opinion dynamic model
with memory effect to explain this statistic property. In the present agents model, every node is connected with its four adjacent
neighbors inwardly and outwardly on a 2-dimension lattice network. Here nodes and links represent the individuals in a terrorism
social system and the interaction between nodes respectively. Before an attack event occurs every individual has own viewpoint,
support or opposition which are denoted by σi = 1 and σi = −1. Individual opinion is determined by two factors. One is the
influence of its adjacent neighbors, it is described by
W1(σi,t) = σi,t−1
4∑
j=1
σj,t−1(j = 1, 2, 3, 4). (2)
the other is the individual history memory effect measured by
W2(σi,t) =
{
1, σi,t−1σi,t−2 > 0
0, σi,t−1σi,t−2 < 0.
(3)
Individual opinion turnovers with time by the above factors in terms of next rule: W1 > 0 means individual has consis-
tent opinion with the majority of its adjacent neighbors and change his/her own opinion with the probability [exp(−aW1) +
exp(−bW2)]/T . W1 < 0 corresponds with the opposite case. In this case history memory effect dominates and individual
changes his/her opinion with the probability exp[−bW2]. So the overturning probability is
P (σi) =
{
[exp(−aW1) + exp(−bW2)]/T,W1 > 0
exp(−bW2),W1 < 0.
(4)
Here the parameters a and b are the main factors indicating the social conformity psychology and self-affirm psychology respec-
tively. T ≥ 2.0 is an index to describe the social chaotic degree. By this rule the system undergoes self-organization evolution
in the non-equilibrium state.
Now we measure the order degree of the public opinion by an order parameter m (0 ≤ m ≤ 1) on a lattice network with size
L× L and periodic boundary,
m = |
1
L2
L2∑
j=1
σi|, σi ∈ (+1,−1) (5)
Generally the total population of a terrorism social system is approximately invariant. So let L = 10 and the initial states are
given randomly. No matter how complicated that the practical reasons may be, we think an attack event is triggered when m
reaches a critical value mc. Next we investigate the influence of different parameters on the interevent time statistic property by
simulation.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The normalized distribution of interevent time by simulation under the influence of one parameter among a = 1.2, b =
0.5, T = 5.5, mc = 0.7. (a) The distribution curves when the parameter a is changed. The two solid lines are the fitting of power-law with
the exponent α = 1.75 and α = 2.52 respectively. The top inset: relationship between a and α. (b) The variation of distribution curves when
the paramter b is changed. (c) the distribution curves when the parameter T is changed. Two curves fit by two solid lines has scaling exponent
α = 1.42 and α = 2.85 respectively. The top inset: α as a function of T . (d) The variation of distribution curves when the parameter mc is
changed. Each data is obtained by averaging over 100 independent runs.
IV. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
First, the social conformity will impact on the whole social order degree and smaller a indicates individual has larger will-
ingness to follow social public opinion. In Fig. 3 (a) the interevent time distribution is plotted for different values of a . It is
shown that the distribution transits to power-law style from power-law-like style with a tail gradually when a increases. For
power-law-like style at a = 0.5 a natural cutoff of tail is executed, then the power exponent α is obtained by linear fitting.
Obviously, the power exponent becomes larger with the increase of a, which means the distribution of terrorism events is more
inhomogeneous when individual inclines to follow public opinion more easily. From the inset in Fig. 3 (a), one can see that α
increases as a increases and converges to a steady value when a is large enough. This is because the effect of the public opinion
is so weak for large a that the dynamic evolution of terrorism attack is hardly affected.
In the evolution of terrorism events, self-affirmation psychology is also very important for social order degree. Together with
the social conformity, they countermine wether an individual overturns his/her opinion when individual opinion agrees with
the major opinion. However, in converse case, the self-affirmation play a decisive role in individual opinion selection. At the
moment, individual will make a decision according to history selection in memory. Now let us pay attention to the effect of
self-affirmation factor b on time statistic property of terrorism event. As shown in Fig. 3 (b), the distribution of interevent time
exceeds a power law when the self-affirmation is inadequate at large b value. The distribution curve becomes a power-law and
then tends to a stretched exponent style with the decrease of b in that the strengthening of self-affirmation reduces the time
interval between two consecutive terrorism events. Meanwhile it makes terrorism event with short interevent time occur with
smaller probability. Indeed social conformity and self-affirmation are two factors who are complementary to each other and
mutual restraint to reach balance.
The third tunable parameter is T , which implies the chaotic degree of a social circumstance. It will be effective as individual
opinion keeps consistent with the public opinion. Similar with Fig. 3 (a), the increase of T also leads to the increase of power
exponent and reduce of interevent time of terrorism events from Fig. 3 (c). But, compared with the a, it is different that the large
T still has obvious influence on power exponent from the inset.
The above three factors determine the order degree of public opinion. We need to set a critical value of order parameter mc to
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FIG. 4: The circles represent simulation results for interevent time distribution of the terrorism attack events in (a) Iraq and (b) Afghanistan
and the solid line is the linear fitting. Each data is obtained by averaging over 100 independent runs.
judge whether a terrorism event burst. Fig. 3 (d) displays the influence of different critical value mc on the curve style. It is very
easy to achieve consensus when mc is small. So the terrorism event bursts frequently. Contrarily time interval of the terrorism
event becomes longer in a way. The curve style transits to the stretched exponent because the proportion of the middling time
interval is prominent relatively.
From Fig. 3, one can find that the style of distribution curve is decided by the self-affirmation psychology and the critical order
parameter. The social conformity and the chaotic degree of a social circumstance decide the power exponent. So the specific
power-law style with some exponent will be got if only we choose appropriate parameter values. According to the property
above, we choose a = 1.31, b = 0.50, T = 5.50,mc = 0.70 and a = 1.20, b = 0.50, T = 5.50,mc = 0.70 to simulate the
terrorism events in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 4. The present model generates
the power-law distribution with exponent α = 2.43 and α = 2.35 which accord with the empirical data. It is noted that the
strong self-affirmation and weak social conformity are the significant character for Iraq. Nevertheless these two factors are
almost equivalent for Afghanistan.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, from real data we find the scale-free feature of interevent time distribution for terrorism event in Iraq and
Afghanistan from 2003 to 2007. Here we consider the assumption that the burst of a terrorism event is closely relative to the
formation of opinions. This formation process depends on not only the social influence but also the individual memory. Previous
terrorism models have noted the former but ignored the later. So, to understand the observed statistic property from empirical
data, we proposed an opinion dynamic model with memory effect in this paper. In the model, the order degree of public opinion
determines the burst of a terrorism event. In certain social circumstance, the formation of public opinion depends individual
psychology character of social conformity and self-affirmation. So individual psychology factor is the crucial reason whether a
terrorism burst in a given social circumstance. This also alert us to poll is important in some wars. Winning morale to strengthen
the social conformity is a possible means of reduce terrorism events. These results obtained by this model are coincide with the
reality intuitively and it can reproduce the same power-law interevent time distribution of terrorism attack as the empirical data
in Iraq and Afghanistan. It confirms the rationality of our assumption and provides a better understanding of the terrorism attack.
In addition, terrorism events can be treated as a kind of collective behaviors of human. Our studies show that the memory and
social effect could be an origin of the power-law properties in many collective behaviors of human.
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